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The momentous events of 1989-1991 marked the end of the Soviet Union 
and, as a result, its threat to the interests of the free world. One of those 
free-world interests was-and is-the ability to use the planet's seas and oceans 
on all lawful occasions. Another is not to be threatened by hostile seaborne 
forces. 
Though most ships of the old Soviet fleet still exist, the political will to use 
them as the old rulers used them has vanished. Now an impoverished and 
geographically, demographically, and industrially reduced Russia has difficulty 
even in maintaining the visible shells of its former naval might. 
With its only rival at sea self-humbled, the United States now has unchal­
lenged maritime superiority and, as part of that, presumptive blue-water sea 
control. Other nations may subject us to harassment at sea in a regional 
contingency, but any country's ability to build a serious blue-water challenge 
would take years and enormous expense. 
Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that control of the seas was a worthy goal, and 
he devoted most of his writing on how to achieve that end. Now that we hold 
unchallenged presumptive sea control, we must reach beyond Mahan's mark 
and develop new and appropriate ways to protect our country's interests. Most 
of those ways will be to affect people and events above the high-water mark. 
Late in 1991, the National Command Authority published a new national 
security strategy that stressed a regional rather than a global approach.} Shortly 
thereafter the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a new national military strategy 
which also stresses a regional approach.2 The new military strategy has as its 
basis four fundamental legs: forward presence, crisis response, strategic deter­
rence, and reconstitution. This study examines the naval strategic contribution 
to each of those legs. 
Now more than half a decade old, the Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened 
both the unified Commanders in Chief (CinCs) and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. Its influence is becoming ever more apparent and is bringing 
about profound change in the way the U.S. naval services do business. Service 
chiefs are now providers of forces to the warfighting regional commanders. The 
underlying reality here is that Service strategic policy formulation, doctrine, 
and force structure are both more joint and more customer-oriented than before. 
The reality that they must continue on that course is explored in this study. 
Late in 1991, the Secretary of the Navy directed the Chief of Naval Opera­
tions (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) to convene a 
naval force capabilities planning effort (NFCPE) to determine a new strategic 
direction for the naval services. The document that resulted is titled ..... From 
the Sea." It includes several bold new steps in designing a suitable naval strategy 
and its corresponding doctrine; however, it is merely a first step. Much more 
needs to be done if we are to succeed in creating a naval capability truly in step 
with the times. This study uses" ... From the Sea" as a departure point to make 
the recommendations that this author believes are necessary to flesh out that 
document and make the concepts found in it work. 3 
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Forward Presence 
What Is Forward Presence and Why Do We Need It? Forward presence 
operations were once a "lesser included case" within the concept of a global 
containment policy. This policy was largely implemented through a strategy of 
forward defense against the threat of aggression from the Communist bloc. An 
extensive network of bases supported the forward deployments. Together they 
were regarded as our first line of defense against Soviet expansionism. While 
the regional stability that resulted from such endeavors was necessary to support 
the strategy, it remained a secondary consideration of that strategy. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent absence of a true global 
superpower threat ended the need for a worldwide containment strategy but led 
to the need for both regional national security and military strategies. The nature 
of this new environment is also characterized by a significant decrease in the 
availability of forward bases worldwide.4 However, U.S. planners realize that 
a strong forward presence is required in order to nurture stability on a region­
by-region basis; hence, forward presence has become one of the four founda­
tions of the new U.S. National Military Strategy.5 There are three major areas 
of endeavor in which forward presence will be vital to regional stability: 
Prevention. The old adage, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of 
cure" is highly applicable here. Prevention is a function of deterrence plus early 
reaction. Should deterrence fail, early reaction can prevent a minor crisis from 
growing into a major one. Perhaps the most striking example of forward 
presence as a deterrent is the long-standing U.S. presence in Western Europe, 
which symbolizes resolve and the inevitability of immediate escalation should 
an act of aggression bring the perpetrator into direct conflict with the United 
States. During the early stages of the Cold War, the U.S. presence in Europe 
was used as a "trip wire" that threatened the Soviet Union with a massive 
nuclear response should it invade Western Europe.6 Later, more emphasis was 
placed on conventional forces and the concept of global forward defense.' With 
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the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many in the United States saw the potential 
to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe; interestingly enough, we are now finding 
that a U.S. presence in Europe as well as in other regions is still considered to 
be a stabilizing factor by regional leaders there. 
This is true also in the Middle East and the Pacific Rim, where continued 
U.S. presence encourages regional stability, perhaps because the United States 
often serves as an "honest broker" among the leaders of nations who are, by 
heritage, extremely suspicious of one another. 
How effective is deterrence? While it is always difficult to prove the negative 
case, we know that in areas such as Korea and Western Europe, where the 
United States has shown clear and unambiguous resolve, that resolve has never 
been tested. In 1950, when we led others to believe South Korea was outside 
our defensive perimeter and thus of little concern to us, the result was a costly 
war. In the summer of 1990, the United States sent ambiguous signals about 
what it might do if Kuwait were invaded by Iraq. And so, even though we had 
naval presence in the area, our resolve was tested quickly by Saddam Hussein, 
who mistakenly perceived a lack of resolve; and,just as in Korea in 1950, war 
resulted-a conflict that might otherwise have been avoided. The deterrent 
effect of forward presence is a function of the credibiility of that presence and 
the perception of resolve emanating from Washington. If either is perceived to 
be lacking, the deterrent effect is diminished. 
If a crisis cannot be deterred, there are situations in which the judicious and 
prompt use of forces forward will contain a crisis and prevent escalation. Some 
critics of the U.S. conduct of the 1975 Mayaguez crisis believe that the prompt 
use of U.S. force probably averted a long-term hostage crisis similar to those 
the nation endured following the capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968 and of the 
U.S. Embassy in Teheran in 1979. The use of non-combatant evacuation 
operations (NEOs) has almost certainly saved the lives of many American 
citizens over the years. In the last two decades, NEOs have been conducted by 
forward deployed naval forces in diverse places such as Vietnam, Cyprus, 
Yemen, Lebanon, Liberia, and Somalia. The general trend toward localized 
instability and problems of governance throughout the world indicates that 
NEOs will be conducted more frequently in the future. 
Although not generally associated with vital U.S. interests, the ability to use 
forward presence forces to conduct humanitarian operations has been a for­
tunate by-product of forward presence operations. Recent humanitarian opera­
tions in Somalia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Kurdistan have been 
successful in demonstrating an American commitment to, and rapid responsive­
ness in, helping friends in need. 
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The early use of our forward presence forces in Somalia and Iraq in late 1992 
and 1993 to react quickly to a developing crisis are good examples here. The 
traditional forward presence mix of carrier battle group, ARG/MEU, and MPS 
were the initial naval components of the U.S. response. 
In addition, the active participation of U.S. military forces in the war on drugs 
has become a prominent element of forward presence in several regions. The 
United States is now gaining enough experience in these operations to develop 
a sense for the kind of skills and force structure needed in each region. These 
operations appear to work well in areas where we have chosen to apply them 
(and they are exhibiting benefits that outweigh the costs). 
Access to Resources and Markets. Another argument for conducting 
forward presence operations to preserve stability is that it protects continued 
U.S. access to resources and ensures stable markets for U.S. trade. It is unfair 
to say that the United States went to war in 1991 solely to ensure access to 
Middle East oil. Nevertheless, if the oil supply were under the control of a 
hostile power, the U.S. strategic-economic position would be severely under­
mined. There is no way to prove that the Gulf war could have been prevented 
by a more aggressive and visible forward presence in that region, but there is a 
growing body of evidence to substantiate that the prevention of a crisis is critical 
to preserving the economic well-being of a nation. Professor Richard N. 
Cooper, a Harvard economist and pioneer of this premise, reasons that there 
was a direct correlation between the 1991-1992 recession and the crisis in the 
Gulf.8 The point to be made here is that avoiding a crisis saves money by 
avoiding the kind of recessionary impact which Professor Cooper discusses. 
By concluding that a crisis led to recession in the Gulf case, Professor Cooper 
indirectly begs a comparison with the absence of recession in 1987-1988 when 
the United States forcefully and decisively reflagged Kuwaiti tankers and 
adequately protected them with an enhanced U.S. forward naval presence. 
Despite several shooting incidents, no real crisis evolved, and no recession 
creating oil price hikes resulted as it did in 1973 and 1979 when real or imagined 
oil supply crises occurred. It would appear that the perception of stability can 
be as important as its actual existence. 
In the Far East, stability is considered a vital regional issue. Public 
pronouncements of leaders such as Lee Quan Yew of Singapore stress that 
fact.9 The point is made even more forcefully by people from abroad who visit 
the United States or live here for business purposes. The Japanese are particular­
ly concerned with sustaining an ongoing U.S. presence to preserve regional 
stability.IO Nations in that part of the world that are mutually suspicious 
maintain bilateral security agreements with the United States. This tends to 
ameliorate local animosities and suspicions. These bilateral agreements and the 
3 
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presence of the U. S. Seventh Fleet and other U. S. military units tend to temper 
regional antagonisms. 
But what good does this stability provide the U.S. taxpayer? The answer is, 
regional stability encourages regional prosperity. The Economist recently ob­
served-as have many other news media-that the Far East is the fastest 
growing economic market in the world. 11 This is crucial to American workers 
who desperately seek overseas markets for their products; the markets exist, 
and it behooves us to invest in their growth. In 1991, U.S. exports to the region 
grew by 20 percent.12 That figure is expected to continue increasing as U.S. 
manufacturers seize opportunities to cater to the newly affluent Far East 
consumers. Stable foreign markets mean jobs at home. 
In the Third World, coalition-building is perceived as a slow, long-tenn 
process. The bilateral alliances that the United States has built in both the 
Mid-East and the Far East are considered by some as the seeds of future standing 
regional coalitions. However, the potting soil for those seeds is U.S. forward 
presence. Without that presence, with its web of bilateral arrangements, 
regional security mechanisms will probably not sprout. This long-tenn invest­
ment in regional security will eventually enable us to greatly reduce the naval 
forces committed to these regions as our presence is replaced largely by 
coalition partners. Unlike the immediate and precipitous flight from forward 
presence advocated by some, this long-tenn plan will avoid our having to 
"reinvent the wheel" as we have done again and again in the Middle East and 
Europe. The current evolution of Nato into a coalition in which U.S. troops will 
not be the primary military force did not occur quickly. Coalition-building is a 
long-tenn investment. 
This concept for regional security requires patience in addition to the 
long-tenn approach to coalition building. It also requires a short-tenn invest­
ment in continued forward presence, which will ultimately pay off handsomely 
if handled properly. The use of forward-deployed U.S. forces to encourage 
long-tenn multinational confidence-building measures is a low investment for 
a future with high return potential. In both Korea and Europe, U.S. forces have 
provided both the nucleus around which successful security structures have 
been built and the glue to hold them together. Our current ability to draw down 
U.S. forces is a measure of success, not retrenchment. 
The key to this long-tenn process of using our web of bilateral agreements 
to build future coalitions is the participation of forward presence forces in 
bilateral exercises. Many of these exercises are naval in character. USCentCom, 
in particular, is being extremely innovative in its use of the Marine expedition­
ary unit, special operations capable (MEU[SOC]), with its associated am­
phibious ready group (ARG), as a non-intrusive tool for conducting an 
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aggressive bilateral exercise program in its area of concern, while simul­
taneously encouraging multilateral exercises as a step toward regional collec­
tive security. In this manner, the advantage of coalition building becomes a 
welcome by-product of an already needed forward presence mission. 
Is Forward Presence Really Vital? How important is forward presence com­
pared to crisis response? We may liken presence to the cop on the beat deterring 
crime on the scene, and crisis response to a police policy that, from a centralized 
location, reacts to a crime in progress. It is much less expensive to prevent a 
crisis than it is to react to one. Of course, if a crisis erupts anyway, one must 
act swiftly and forcibly. The events in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991 illustrate 
this. Neither forward presence nor crisis response is more important than the 
other, and neither is complete without the other. 
The Naval Aspects of Forward Presence. The announced policy of the U.S. 
military for the next decade is to reduce overseas basing while simultaneously 
maintaining an active forward presence in those regions where it is vital to U.S. 
national securityY The most obvious candidate for carrying out most such 
missions will be our naval forces; by naval, we speak of both Navy and Marine 
Corps forces. A look at the proposed composition of forces articulated in the 
new National Military Strategy confirms this, as outlined in figure 1. 
Speaking to the staff of III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in Okinawa 
in 1989, shortly after he assumed command, Lieutenant General (then Major 
General) H. C. Stackpole ill stated the need for forward presence forces to be 
credible, sustainable, and flexible.14 That statement remains relevant today, 
although given today's technology, this does not necessarily mean a large 
ground force. The new National Military Strategy does not necessarily call for 
our forces to defend forward, but it definitely rejects the notion that such forces 
be a mere "trip wire."ls General Carl Mundy, Commandant of the U.S. Marine 
Corps, foresees that these naval elements will provide the capability for U.S. 
joint reaction forces to respond in a timely fashion should deterrence or 
containment of a crisis fail or should a disaster require rapid, self-sustained 
relief forces.16 This enabling function provides impetus to the concepts of 
credibility, sustainability, and flexibility articulated by Lieutenant General 
Stackpole. For example, in 1990, Marine Corps maritime prepositioning forces 
(MPF) provided the first credible and sustainable U.S. ground forces in Saudi 
Arabia. Within twenty days of the beginning of the deployment, over 33,000 
Marines, complete with armor and aircraft, were deployed in Saudi Arabia with 
thirty days of supplies and equipment. Some of these supplies sustained Army 
and Air Force units until their supplies arrived in September. The basic 
5 
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Force Composition 
n.n BASEmB�E 
I Strategic Bombers 8-52 + B-1 B-S2H + B-1 + B-2 Missiles 1000 550 
SS8Ns 34 18 
I Anny I Active 16 Divisions 12 Divisions Reserve 10 Divisions 6 Divisions 
Cadre 2 Divisions 
� Ships 
530 (IS CV8Gs) 450 (12 CV8Gs) Supports Forward 
Active 13 Air Wings 11 Air Wings Deployed Forces. 
Reserve 2 Air Wings 2 Air Wings 
I USMC Active 3MEFs 3MEFs One MEF Forward Reserve 1 D1vlslon/Wlng 1 Divlsion/Wlng Deployed; others In 
support 
I Air Force I Active 22FWE ISFWE 12FWE 11 FWE Reserve 
CVBG: Carrier Battle Group MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force FWE: Fighter Wing Equivalent 
Source: Adapted from draft document of the National Military Strategy. September 1991. 
Figure I 
capabilities required to introduce these key concepts into each of the three 
regions are listed below. 
Credibility. Because of the general need to gain and maintain air superiority, 
and given our desire to reduce overeseas basing, it is necessary to keep an 
aircraft carrier (or its equivalent) in each of the three vital regions. But, as a 
result of the demise of the fonner Soviet Union and the resulting reduced threat 
to our carriers, in most cases the number of escorts that each carrier needs may 
be reduced. 
The presence of a carrier battle group or a similar capability is as much a 
political signal of U.S. interest in the region as it is a military instrument. This 
visible manifestation of U.S. power and resolve reassures allies and keeps 
potential adversaries warned of the consequences of their actions. For the near 
tenn, an aircraft carrier group, or a like capability, along with an ARG/MEU 
(SOC), and an MPS appear to be the bottom line of forward presence in the 
Mediterranean, Persian Gulf region, and WestPac. 
Flexibility. The flexibility necessary to implement the National Military 
Strategy from a forward presence perspective resides largely in the capability 
of the ARG/MEU(SOC). The eighteen mission profiles of the MEU(SOC) are 
listed in figure 2. These mission profiles allow the MEU(SOC) to contribute 
substantially in responding quickly to a minor crisis before it becomes 
6 
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MAGTF Mission ProfIles and Strategic Niches 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU(SOC)]. The MEU(SOC) is 
the Marine Corps' primary instrument for forward presence operations. Aside from being forward 
deployed to demonstrate U.S. interest and resolve in a region, it has the capability to carry out 
the following mission profiles in order to protect U.S. interests by quickly dealing with. or 
containing, a lesser regional contingency: 
• Amphibious raids 
• Limited objective attacks 
• Reinforcement operations 
• Deception operations 
• Fire support control operations 
• Counterintelligence operations 
• In extremis hostage rescue 
• Non-combatant evacuations (NE0s) 
• Tactical recovery of aircraft and 
personnel (TRAP) 
• Military operations in urban 
terrain (MOUl) 
• Security operations 
• Show of force 
• Civil Affairs operations 
• Clandestine recovery operations 
• Specialized demolitions 
• Shipboarding operations 
• Electronic warfare operations 
• Gas/oil platfonn seizure 
(Although not a SOC capability, MEUs can assist in the conduct of humanitarian assistance 
operations.) 
Source: Data from advertised Marine Capabilities in Headquarters u.s. Marine Corps publications. 
Figure 2 
uncontrollable. The capability to conduct opposed NEOs is particularly attrac­
tive in an era of increasing governance problems. 
Although not currently listed as among the missions to be performed by an 
ARG/MEU(SOC), such a force can conduct humanitarian assistance/disaster 
relief operations as shown by the Bangladesh episode in 1991 and that in 
Somalia in 1992-1993. This sea-based capability gives U.S. policymakers 
greater flexibility than alternative options do. 
In addition, the ARG/MEU (SOC) can use the flexibility offered by sea-basing 
to begin building multilateral military cooperation from the existing web of 
bilateral agreements in the Middle East and the Pacific Rim. The non-intrusive­
ness offered by sea-basing allows the ARG/MEU(SOC) the versatility to exercise 
at sea and in the air with one partner, while conducting an amphibious exercise 
with another in an overall coalition-like manner, without forcing the potentially 
contentious issues that would emerge in conventional multilateral ground 
exercises. 
SustainabiJity. The fmal leg of this forward presence triad is the capacity to 
sustain forces up front during the initial stages of a crisis. In this respect, 
sustainability becomes the first manifestation of the enabling bridge between 
7 
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forward presence and crisis response. It is not limited to the expertise of naval 
forces to sustain themselves; it also facilitates the capability to support other 
forces flowing into theater in the early stages of a crisis, such as in 1990 when 
Marine and Navy forces logistically supported Anny and Air Force units 
extensively during the first week of Operation Desert Shield.17 
Having sustainable forward deployed forces in regions where we have vital 
interests will provide special challenges in an era of dwindling forward basing. 
In a speech in Indonesia on 30 April 1991, then U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Richard Cheney reaffinned that the United States would look for means other 
than basing to support forward presence operations.18 Commander Barry 
Coombs of the Naval War College has investigated this area and maintains that 
"while current basing is adequate for peacetime forward presence operations, 
surge or extended operations may be difficult to support from the logistics 
standpoint. Innovative solutions for logistics support to combat forces are 
required in view of basing losses. These solutions may rest in expanded 
prepositioning, increased Navy use of strategic sealift and contract commercial 
assets, stronger host nation support (HNS) agreements, or in enhancing the 
scope of the Combat Logistics Force ... 19 
The maritime prepositioning force (MPF) program provides one of the key 
elements in General Mundy's enabling bridge concept. Although the entire MPF 
operation can best be viewed as a crisis action mechanism, the fact that the ships 
of the maritime prepositioning squadrons (MPS), which actually carry the heavy 
equipment for the MPF, are forward deployed in the region, makes MPS a de 
facto forward presence asset. Figure 3 is a description of the MPF concept for 
readers not familiar with the program. To fully demonstrate its capability, the 
MPF should be exercised frequently as part of the overall U.S. program to 
support alliances and bilateral agreements. 
In forums and war games conducted since the end of the Gulf War, there has 
been a general consensus among strategic thinkers that had the maritime 
prepositioning squadron (MPS) from Diego Garcia been moved early in the 
crisis before the invasion of Kuwait, the signal of U.S. resolve, with adequate 
attendant publicity, might have altered the Iraqi course of action. It is true that 
there is some question whether the Iraqis were capable of accurately assessing 
MPF capability in order to properly read the signal. Both of these arguments 
point toward more aggressive use of the MPF as a forward presence tool in 
non-crises. An extensive program of exercise offloads would demonstrate the 
program's capability in defensively reinforcing threatened friends as well as its 
ability to enhance our offensive amphibious capability. Both U.S. Commander 
in Chief Pacific Command (USCinCPac) and U.S. Commander in Chief Central­




J. R. Nunes, j. 
Source: Redrawn from U,S. Marine Corps Operations Handbook 1-5. 
Figure 3 
What Is New in the Regional Approach? Thus far in this discussion, naval 
forces in the new world order probably look much like naval forces in the Cold 
War. On the surface, this is true; the day-to-day capabilities that are needed in 
a region to cover the range of stability requirements that have been discussed 
do appear familiar, but surface appearances can indeed be deceiving. During 
the Cold War, it was necessary for our forces to be reasonably concentrated in 
order to be prepared for battle, which theoretically could have erupted at any 
time. Carriers generally needed constant escort, and they maintained a high 
level of combat readiness at all times. Day-to-day, region-by-region, the 
situation has changed. A much higher degree of independent steaming is 
allowable, and carriers will not require all the combat capabilities of a CBVG 
all of the time. 
A higher degree of independent steaming will allow naval forces to "show 
the flag" in more ports and in more peacetime exercises than was previously 
possible, while continuing to maintain the preparedness of naval force packages 
that are necessary to concentrate quickly to deal with brewing crises. Some 
9 
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planners liken this capability to a soccer game where well-drilled team members 
spread out to play their positions until a friendly scoring opportunity or 
opposition threat requires a combination of players to deal with the situation. 
Once the situation has passed, the players resume their original positions. Figure 
4 illustrates this concept. 
The playing field in figure 4 is superimposed on a map that transcends two 
CinCs' boundaries in order to show the need to make boundaries between fleet 
CinCs much more permeable than they have been?l This is a fundamental 
change occurring since the Goldwater-Nichols military reform legislation 
passed in the mid-eighties. The regional warfighting CinCs are the employers 
of forces, while the Services act as providers. The Services would be ill-advised 
to put themselves in a position of telling the warfighting CinC that he cannot 
have a certain force package in a timely manner due to geographic internal 
Service constraints; thus, the requirement for increasing permeability of boun­
daries. 
Finally, regionalization may well mean that forward presence force packages 
can be closely tailored to suit regional peculiarities. For example, an MEU(SOC) 
in the Middle East may be built around mobile assets, such as the light armored 
vehicle, to allow for substantial distances which may have to be traveled over 
the ground. In addition, the absence of a high-intensity Soviet air and submarine 
threat may, in most regions, allow for a greater number of attack aircraft aboard 
carriers (at the expense of ASW aircraft) in order to counter the criticism in 
some quarters that the Navy did not bring enough "air-to-mud" capability to 
the theater during Operation Desert Storm. Some regional situations may 
actually allow us to combine functions of the ARG and CBVG or the ARG and 
MPS should the need arise. 
The Role of Naval Forward Presence in Alliance Maintenance and Coali­
tion-Building. Naval forces play an extensive role in maintaining our alliances 
and bilateral agreements worldwide. The majority of this effort is in the form 
of comprehensive exercise programs, the size and scope of which vary from 
region to region. Given the demise of the Soviet Union as a superpower threat, 
Nato exercises in Europe can be expected to decrease. The number of bilateral 
exercises in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf, has expanded 
exponentially as a result of the 1991 war. In the Pacific, we can expect the 
number of exercises to remain steady or even increase in the event we begin 
doing bilateral work with the Russians. We have not designed regional force 
structure around exercise programs, but in the future we need to ensure that we 
have sufficient assets to participate fully in exercises that support alliances and 
bilateral agreements. This is particularly important in the Middle East and 
10 
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Boundaries Between Fleet CinCs 
J,A. �uoes, Jr 
Source: Redrawn from Secretary of the Navy draft Force Capabilities Planning Effort, dated February 
1992. Concept introduced by Colonel Mike Strickland, USMC. 
Figure 4 
Pacific Rim where we are attempting to build our web of bilateral agreements 
into lasting, standing multinational mechanisms. 
Recommendations. The naval services must develop, for each of the unified 
CinCs, forward presence force packages sufficient both to maintain stability in 
their region and to assure the CinCs that they can count on the naval share of 
these forces that would be needed to handle crises should such arise. The mix 
of capabilities will be distinctive to each region. The variables will include 
forces for drug interdiction and for exercises in support of alliances and bilateral 
agreements. However, in the three regions deemed to be of vital interest to the 
United States, several core capabilities are essential. These are: a CBVG-like 
capability on station constantly or nearly so; an ARG/MEU(SOC)-like capability; 
and an MPS and suitable afloat forward sea-based sustainability. The last of 
these is necessary to support the transition to crisis response. 
Each region should have a standing expeditionary naval headquarters in 
order to furnish the necessary local expertise for command and control of naval 
expeditionary forces (NEFs). Such headquarters, which would replace the 
current numbered fleets, would consist of balanced operational Navy-Marine 
Corps staffs as outlined in figure 5. Command would alternate between Navy 
11 
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Balanced Operational Navy-Marine Corps StatTs 






I I 1 
SEA MANEUVER LAND MANEUVER SEA MANEUVER LAND MANEUVER 
ELEMENT ELEMENT ELEMENT ELEMENT 
SUPPORT SUPPORT 
ELEMENT ELEMENT 
Source: Redrawn from February 1991 draft Force Capabilities Planning Effort (unpublished White Paper). 
This draft eventually resulted in M • • •  From the Sea, published by the Secretary of the Navy late in 1992. 
FIgureS 
and Marine Corps officers. The staff would have a heavier regional political­
military orientation than today's numbered fleets. 
As illustrated on the left of figure 5, the naval expeditionary force, with its 
three primary elements, would be organized administratively and for combat 
in a major regional contingency. For day-to-day forward presence operations 
it would use deployed naval expeditionary task forces as shown on the right of 
the diagram. Each could be a miniature representation of the NEF, although 
some might look like the conventional ARGs, MPS, and carrier battle groups 
that we deploy today. In all cases, they would employ a "blue-green" staff mix. 
Finally, boundaries between fleet CinCs should become much more perme­
able, and standardized doctrine should be developed at a joint naval (Navy­
Marine Corps) doctrine center. 
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Crisis Response 
Desert Storm Is Not Necessarily the Future. In 1967 the Israeli anned forces 
easily defeated the combined forces of their Arab opponents in a six-day 
campaign. For six years thereafter, Israel was generally considered to be the 
premier military power in the Middle East; most observers felt that the Arabs 
lacked the technological sophistication and military skill to challenge the 
Israelis seriously. The Egyptians and Syrians did not accept this evaluation. 
They carefully gathered lessons learned from the 1967 war and used the 
advantages of emerging technologies to overcome the qualitative Israeli supe­
riority in tank and air crews. The Israelis had become complacent, and they paid 
the price for their overconfidence. 
In a surprise attack in 1973, the Egyptians and the Syrians struck. Using 
anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and well-drilled assault troops, the Arabs 
crossed into territory occupied by the Israelis and established bridgeheads that, 
for a time, they succeeded in defending.22 Although the Israelis rallied from 
their initial suprise and achieved a tactical and operational victory, the strategic 
results led to peace talks that constitute what the Arabs have always considered 
to be a moral victory. 23 
Just as in 1967, the U.S.-led coalition victory over Iraq in 1991 is viewed by 
some in the United States and abroad as a seminal event in military history and 
the beginning of an era of unchallenged U.S. military superiority. To accept 
this viewpoint without reservation may well be as dangerous as was the postwar 
Israeli overconfidence in 1967-1973. 
We must assume that potential future adversaries, the Iraqis included, will 
refuse to accept the verdict of Desert Stonn as conclusive proof of unchallenged 
U.S. military superiority. We must assume further that these potential future 
adversaries are studying the 1991 results as carefully as the Egyptians and 
Syrians studied those of 1967. 
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How would an opponent such as Iraq attempt to deal with us by learning 
from Desert Shield and Desert Storm? His first moves would probably be 
political acts to deny us basing and overflight rights from neighbors of his 
intended victim. This would foreclose our ability to repeat our long force 
buildup in Saudi Arabia prior to Operation Desert Storm. Next, an aggressor 
would be well advised to accumulate sufficient "state-of-the art" technology to 
deny us sea control near his littoral waters to ensure that we cannot get close 
enough to conduct power projection, particularly in the form of amphibious 
operations. If a future opponent could replicate a modem technological 
equivalent of the kind of point defense that the fortifications of Charleston, 
South Carolina, provided during the Civil War-and Charleston was the 
Union's greatest naval frustration of that war-he might well put U.S. leaders 
in a situation where the price to be paid exceeds the value to be gained through 
military action.24 He would also mine nearby choke points, such as the Strait 
of Hormuz, which we would need to get U.S. forces to the theater. He would 
probably try to preemptively attack the ports and airfields through which we 
would attempt a DesertShield-type buildup. This might be done through the 
use of special operations, chemical weapons, or even nuclear weapons. Jam­
ming or otherwise denying us the satellite communications links so vital in 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm would be a logical step as well. Once the United 
States is denied a base of operations in the area, the aggressor could pick off 
his victim and attempt to consolidate his gains quickly, before we could react. 
He could hope to render a U.S. response too expensive to contemplate. We must 
consider how we would have reacted in Saudi Arabia had access to Dhahran 
and Jubail been denied us. In the case of an Iraqi or Iranian action, it might well 
be that a diplomatic settlement extorted from the Gulf Cooperation Council 
states would effectively freeze us out of the Middle East. 
The Naval Dimension. With the possible exception of the first step, the 
worst-case adversary strategy described above would be aimed at denying us 
both the naval bridge to, and the door into, the theater of operations. In all 
probability, most potential adversaries realize that they probably cannot stand 
up to the array of power that faced Iraq after six months ofU .S. military buildup 
in Saudi Arabia. Considering that, they probably will not even try to do so; thus, 
the strategy of denying us the buildup in the first place. Given the choice 
between negotiations on unfavorable terms or having to fight their way back 
into the theater, some players simulating the U.S. national leadership in seminar 
war games on this subject have chosen to negotiate at unfavorable terms to U.S. 
and allied interests, with all of the negative implications of so doing. Stated 
simply, we surrendered.25 
14 
Anderson 
Given current amphibious ship decommissioning projections, it is conceiv­
able that if the u.s. forces on the ground were overrun early, we would not have 
enough amphibious assault or follow-on shipping to re-enter the Arabian 
peninsula between the years 1997 and 2000. 
In either case, the protection of our enabling bridge into the theater, or the 
need to "kick down the door" should that bridge be disrupted, is primarily a 
naval function. The capabilities needed will be endangered if we shape the 
post-Cold War Navy as we shaped it to meet a blue-water threat. The results 
of Desert Stonn indicate that our naval littoral capability needs considerable 
work if it is truly to become the naval focus of effort in the coming years. Our 
capability to clear mines in a timely manner was shown to be woefully 
inadequate.26 Similarly, our ability to conduct strike operations from aircraft 
carriers in support of ground troops was far below that required. Further, our 
shallow water antisubmarine warfare capability is currently poor-to-nonex­
istent. Finally, as we have seen, our ability to enter forcibly anywhere will be 
uncertain if present amphibious force projections are not improved.27 
At all costs we should ensure that our naval forces can provide our national 
leaders with viable and acceptable options with which to overcome the kind of 
strategic challenge posed by the hypothetical enemy described above. 
The Desert Storm That Did Not Happen. In Washington today, it is 
fashionable, particularly among Congressional thinkers, to express future force 
structure in Desert Stonn equivalents. This is a convenient budgetary tool; in 
strategic tenns, however, these equivalents mean little if our naval enabling 
bridge is disrupted before we enter into a Desert Stonn-type position. The 
ability to prevent that from happening is not only a function of numbers of ships, 
it is also a function of the kinds of ships we have. We must ensure that among 
them will be enough with the capabilities for intelligence and command and 
control infrastructure. That depends on decisions in the fields of strategy, 
doctrine, and force structure. 
The Civil War Analogy. The U.S. Navy's great sea control conflict was World 
War II. In the Pacific, the Navy battled a Japanese fleet that in the early stages 
of the war came very close to victory and that remained a fonnidable threat 
until the last year of the conflict. In the Atlantic and European theaters, the 
Gennans opposed the Allies with a naval force designed more to deny us free 
use of the sea than to use it themselves. Much the same was true in World War 
I. In the Spanish-American War, although the Spanish fleet was second-rate, 
the United States Navy was forced to deal with it before undertaking other 
military operations. When sea control is not presumptive, all other requirements, 
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including power projection, will be hazardous until the issue of sea control has 
been resolved. 
When sea control is presumptive, it is a different matter entirely. Sea control 
can be presumed when the foe either has no ability to contest control or does 
not wish to risk its forces in such a contest. We fought our war with Mexico, 
the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the war with Iraq with at least 
presumptive sea control. The difficulty has been in translating sea power into 
action capable of directly influencing events ashore. The United States has 
normally addressed this issue through a combination of blockade and power 
projection. 
The United States enjoyed presumptive sea control during the Civil War, 
although in a different way from some of the cases discussed above because, 
for the most part, the United States had to acquire its advanced bases by taking 
them from the enemy. Once that was done, Union naval forces could begin to 
influence events ashore. In Vietnam, Korea, and in Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm, the United States had unopposed access to bases ashore very close to 
the fighting fronts. In the future, the United States may fmd itself in a situation 
more resembling that of the Civil War than those of more recent times. 
In the Civil War, the purpose of the naval expeditionary campaigns was to 
influence directly events ashore; this meant that the targets for naval campaign­
ing were primarily on land. Realizing this, Confederate strategists hardened the 
most obvious landing locations with field fortifications, built ironclads, and 
depended on mobile reserves to deal with Federal attempts at deep amphibious 
operations such as the Peninsula Campaign. 
From the perspective of the U.S. strategists, the two primary tools of the 
Federal Navy during the Civil War were the blockade and the amphibious thrust 
to seize key points and to tie down Confederate troops. Though relying on 
advanced bases usually seized from the foe, blockading was mainly an out­
growth of sea control, whereas Federal power projection efforts were primarily 
naval expeditionary efforts, using the Army as the ground part of the effort. 
There were three primary methods of reducing the Confederate point 
defenses. The first was to pound them into submission, which worked at 
Port Royal and Fort Henry but failed at Charleston and Fort Donelson. Next 
was to run by them and-if necessary-attack them from the rear, as was done 
at Mobile Bay and New Orleans. The third method was to land troops where 
the Confederates were weak and envelop the target from another direction. This 
was accomplished at Vicksburg but failed in the Peninsula Campaign. 
The parallel with the present situation is three-fold. First, the Union's leaders 
in the Civil War faced a situation in which they obtained presumptive sea 
control with a force structure largely designed for a different mission. The 
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orientation of the Union Navy at the start of the Civil War was predicated upon 
harassing operations at sea against a superior foe, presumably Great Britain.28 
It was incumbent upon the Union naval commanders of the Civil War to grow 
a new force. Similarly, as we enter the post-industrial era, we also have a force 
that is not entirely appropriate for the strategic situation we face. While we are 
in a position to downsize, we are challenged to deal with presumptive sea 
control using a force structured to do something else. 
The second parallel to the Civil War concerns our need to project power over 
vast distances into areas where we do not have bases. 
A third parallel concerns major technological change. The Confederates 
attempted to challenge the presumptive Union sea control with torpedoes 
(mines), ironclads, and improved shore-to-ship gunnery. The Union responded 
with technological innovations of its own. By war's end, the United States had 
a naval force well suited for littoral warfare on a grand scale, a navy which, 
once the Confederacy had been destroyed, it quickly scrapped in favor of one 
more suited to traditional U.S. naval missions.29 
The main difference between our situation and that faced by the Union is 
that the Union was confronted by a coherent threat to its survival. Although any 
threat to us is incoherent in the extreme, the two situations have an overarching 
parallel in that each, in its own way, represents a key turning point in the way 
U.S. naval forces do business. 
The Union's leaders responded to the challenges of the Civil War with 
innovations in strategy, tactics, and interservice cooperation, many of which 
were born of desperation. Cooperation with the Army was probably better in 
that conflict than it was prior to the war, and it was not nearly as good again 
until World War II. The navy accepted two key missions. The first was purely 
strategic, in the form of a naval blockade that eventually played a key supporting 
role in breaking the South's will to fight. The second was power projection. 
The blockade became increasingly effective and was a major factor in the 
South's eventual collapse. It was made possible by presumptive Union sea 
control, a presumption that was never seriously challenged during the course 
of the war. To be sure, Southern raiders such as the CSS Alabama were an 
expensive annoyance, but Navy Secretary Gideon Welles wisely kept the focus 
of effort on the blockade despite strong pressure by Northern commercial 
interests to do otherwise. This presumptive sea control would have been 
overturned by British entry into the war; fortunately (since it might well have 
been decisive in the favor of the Confederacy), that did not come to pass. 
The Confederacy made several attempts to challenge the blockade with ironclad 
technology; the most notable of these was highlighted by the Monitor-Merrimac 
confrontation. Such clashes made headlines when they occurred, but the U.S. 
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public and Congress generally presumed Northern sea superiority. Similar 
conditions prevailed in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and in the recent 
Gulf war. In those instances, sea control would never have been truly ap­
preciated unless it had been lost. 
Most of the Civil War naval battles took place when the Union attempted to 
project power against the shore. In this regard, that war was perhaps more like 
World War n in the Pacific than it was to Korea, Vietnam, or the recent war in 
the Gulf. Sea power had to be applied against the shore in areas far removed 
from the bases the United States had. The primary difference between the 
Pacific War, the Civil War, and our situation today is that in the Pacific War 
there was a powerful opposing fleet. Necessarily, all other naval force structure 
was secondary to that needed to win sea control. For the most part, this force 
structuring formula was applied during the Cold War due to the sea denial threat 
posed by the Soviet Navy. The limited wars previously mentioned, which were 
fought under the Cold War umbrella (Desert Storm included), were lesser 
included cases that were fought using the active sea control force structure. 
The primary strategic thrust of Union planning was to develop a two-phased 
approach to power projection campaigns. The first phase was to seize an 
advanced base deep in Confederate territory. In some cases, such as at New 
Orleans, Union forces "kicked down the door" in order to create their advanced 
bases. On the Peninsula, the Union Navy landed General George B. 
McClellan's army where the enemy was not, and it built up a logistics base from 
scratch in a manner similar to the current Navy-Marine Corps "over-the­
horizon" concept. 
Unfortunately for McClellan, he found that getting ashore is only half of the 
equation; once ashore, the ultimate objective must still be obtained. Former 
Secretary of the Navy James Webb pointed this out forcefully to naval planners 
during his tenure, and the observation remains valid today. The key point here 
is that Union naval supremacy made it possible for the Union army to begin 
operations far from its own bases. 
One of the most striking aspects of the rapidly evolving Union strategy 
during the Civil War was the way in which it forced jointness upon often 
unwilling participants. Some combinations of commanders did it better than 
others. General Ulysses S. Grant and Admiral David D. Porter eventually found 
the proper joint mix, but it was not done without a number of false starts.30 In 
the absence of a developed amphibious doctrine, and lacking the robust Marine 
Corps amphibious capability developed in the twentieth century, Army and 
Navy planners improvised as best they could. The end result was not pretty, but 
it generally got the job done. 
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The LiUoral Battle Space Control Area (LBCA). During an era of single­
superpower naval superiority, as in the Civil War, the door through which we 
choose to project sea power ashore and transfonn it into effective actions on 
land is the point at which most naval battles will occur. This area includes the 
point at which we choose to place forces ashore, and the area needed to build 
these forces into a true joint warfighting capability, as well as the sea, air, and 
space areas adjacent to this landward requirement. If this description sounds 
similar to that of the traditional amphibious objective area (AOA), the similarity 
is deliberate; it is the essence of the shift from a blue-water to a littoral naval 
strategic focus. 
One tenn that might be applied to this expanded area is the "battle space."  
In order to  stress the sea-air-shore aspect of the problem, i t  is  preferable to refer 
to it as the littoral battle space control area (LBCA). This area can be envisioned 
as being far larger than the traditional AOA, for it must accommodate all the 
operations of a naval expeditionary force, including its aircraft carriers. 
The LBCA is envisioned as the naval component commander's zone of action 
within the overall battle space controlled by the CinC, sub-unified commander, 
or joint task force commander. If naval forces are first on the scene, the LBCA 
might well include the CinC's entire battle space. As other forces enter the 
theater through the bridge and door provided by naval forces, the LBCA would 
shrink to a size adequate to accommodate the seaward (predominately Navy) 
and landward (predominately Marine Corps) operations of the naval forces. 
The Naval Expeditionary Force. The commander of the regionally oriented 
naval expeditionary force command element, which was designed to manage 
forward presence in chapter 1, would become the naval operational commander 
in a major regional contingency. The NEF, as originally envisioned by the 
NFCPE, is outlined in figure 6. As ajoint Navy-Marine Corps staff, this element 
would coordinate the overall naval warfighting effort in the theater. The NEF 
commander would be an officer of either the Marine Corps or Navy, as 
appropriate, and he would command and control all the aspects of the landward 
and seaward sectors of the LBCA. This would avoid the confusing and poten­
tially disastrous command relationships of Operations Desert Shield and Desert 
Stonn, as shown in figure 7. It would replace them with a cleaner configuration, 
as shown in figure 8, with the NEF commander in charge of all operational 
warfighting naval forces. CA TF/CLF planning relationships remain, using new 
names, but this new relationship is more easily translated into joint tenns. The 
littoral battles pace control area is the naval component commander's AOR. This 
relationship is much more easily understood than the AOA. It also eliminates 
the argument over service versus functional componency. In either situation, 
the Naval Component Commander (NCC)owns all naval forces. 
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Source: Redrawn from NFCPE Report (Quantico: Marine Corps Wargaming and Assessment Center, 
1992). 
FIgure 6 
Figure 7 is a rough approximation of the naval command relationships in the 
CentCom area of responsibility during the Gulf war. The landward area of what 
could be called the littoral zone belonged to the commanding general of I MEF, 
the warfighting operational Marine commander, who was also dual-hatted as 
the Marine component commander. Commmander, Seventh Fleet, was the 
Navy component commander as well as the Navy warfighting commander. He 
had two Marine expeditionary brigades and one MEU under his command 
afloat. There was no one in charge of the overall littoral effort. The fmal decision 
not to conduct an amphibious landing was made at a conference involving 
ComMarCent, ComNavCent, and CinCCentCom (General Norman 
Schwartzkopt). 
The command relationship in figure 8 has the NEF commander in charge of 
all naval forces in the LBCA. His Marine Corps subordinate (land maneuver 
element commander) commands forces ashore, while his Navy subordinate (sea 
maneuver element commander) commands those afloat. A supporting element 
renders logistical (less combat service) support to both. A naval component 
commander would remain with the CinC to assist in political-military and 
strategic planning. He would be the senior naval officer in theater; as such he 
would be responsible for joint strategic naval planning as well as strategic 
logistics. The command relationship is shown in figure 9. 
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The Naval Component Commander. One of the primary criticisms of the naval 
conduct of Operation Desert Storm was of the lack of a strategic naval 
representative in the CinC 's headquarters at RiyadhY The warfighting tacti­
caJjoperational commanders of both the Navy and Marine components were 
dual-hatted as component commanders. This arrangement was both difficult 
and confusing. At the same time, the commanders of the Navy 's Pacific Fleet 
and the Marine Corps' Fleet Marine Corps Pacific were relegated to the status 
of providers of forces and monitors of the situation; this was a far cry from their 
active operationaJjstrategic roles in World War II. This situation repeated itself 
in Operations Sea Angel and Fiery Vigil, the humanitarian relief operations in 
Bangladesh and the Philippines respectively. The Marine Corps has reacted to 
this situation by designating the commanding general of the Fleet Marine Force 
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Pacific as the Marine component commander for the Pacific Command 
(paCom) and Central Command (CentCom) contingencies.32 The Navy has 
designated a separate Navy component commander for CentCom. CinCPac­
Fleet remains the Navy component commander for PaCom. A single designated 
naval component headquarters is needed to handle naval componency issues. 
Separate component and operational commanders are not needed in all cases. 
Lesser regional contingencies such as NEOs and humanitarian operations may 
not require such arrangements. The naval component commander would free 
the NEF commander from the burden of regional strategic planning and allow 
him to concentrate on operational matters. 
It would be best if the Navy and Marine Corps were to combine the staff of 
the two fleet CinCs with those of the two Fleet Marine Force headquarters into 
two super-CinCs (CinC Naval Forces Atlantic and CinC Naval Forces Pacific) 
in order to create a joint naval headquarters. This headquarters would provide 
forces to the unified CinCs on a day-to-day basis as well as develop a series of 
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Overall Command Relationship 







deployable Navy-Marine Corps naval component command battle staffs to 
handle the forward supporting plans as well as naval component issues in a 
theater during contingencies. Navy and Marine Corps flag officers would rotate 
in command; the notion that one has to be a qualified ship'  s commanding officer 
or a regimental commander to do strategic or operational planning at the joint 
level in our new littoral naval environment is no longer supportable. As the NEF 
commander assumes the function of the naval operational commander, the 
naval component commander becomes the chief naval strategist in the theater. 
An NEF commander fights at the operational level of war. The ability to plan 
and operate in a joint and combined environment will take precedence over 
ship-handling or MEF tactical skills. 
Naval Aviation Integration. The integration of naval (Navy and Marine Corps) 
fixed-wing aviation arose late in 1 99 1  as a result of the desire on the part of the 
OpNav staff to ensure that enough aircraft were available to provide a full air 
wing to each of the carriers envisioned in the base force.33 This was to be 
accomplished by assigning some Marine Corps squadrons aboard carriers. This 
has been done before and some Marines see it as a way to ensure that Marine 
aviation support to troops ashore comes early in a littoral amphibious campaign. 
There are serious issues, however, that need to be resolved before integration 
is implemented. 
The first issue involves the command philosophy of the carrier air wing and 
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its staffmg. Many Marines, and not a few sailors, point out that there must be 
a quid pro quo; in a littoral environment they feel that assigning Marine 
squadrons to carrier air wings (CVWs) commanded exclusively by Navy 
officers is both unfair and unwise. If the emphasis is littoral , Marines are going 
to need to learn to do carrier operations better, and Navy pilots must get better 
at air-to-mud work. A truly integrated command and staff arrangement is 
appropriate. These Marines argue that the composition of the CVW staff should 
be Navy-Marine and that command should rotate on a "blue-green" basis. This 
author agrees. 
If we are to develop a truly better naval support of ground forces and a more 
joint orientation in general, Marine Corps command and staff expertise is 
essential to the CVW's ability to plan and execute this improved support. Marine 
aviators are trained to understand ground tactics and combined arms warfare; 
the more senior officers will have attended other service schools as well .  In 
addition, many Marine aviators have served exchange tours with ground units. 
They will be excellent facilitators for "purpling" the CVW. In this manner, the 
true "naval air wing" can be formed for effective carrier air support of littoral 
operations. By the same reasoning, Navy aviators should be given some of the 
same cross-training opportunities as Marines. 
A second major issue that must be addressed before real naval aviation 
integration can be realized is the need for naval aviation to go ashore in an 
expeditionary environment; as the littoral battle moves inland, this will be an 
ongoing requirement. If the CVW needs to be backfilled to replace aviation units 
that have gone ashore, procedures must be devised to accommodate that. We 
need also to address the matter of "yellow gear," the equipment at air bases and 
in carriers needed to support an aviation unit ashore. Marine ground support 
equipment is expeditionary, while comparable Navy equipment generally is 
not. If that fact were to be allowed to govern action, it would lead to the carrier's 
Marine Corps squadrons being dispatched when aviation is to be based ashore, 
while the Navy squadrons stayed afloat. But aviation ground support equipment 
aboard the MPF ships and T-AK aviation support ships can support the Navy's 
squadrons ashore. Navy squadrons from carriers not deployed to the crisis area 
would then backfill the carrier. In Desert Storm, six carriers were deployed. 
This means that if the base force figure of twelve carriers holds true for forward 
presence rotation, and six remains an adequate figure for crisis response, there 
will  be six carriers capable of backfilling the Marine aircraft sent ashore. Such 
an arrangement is acceptable for short regional contingencies. A large threat 
would require reconstitution as outlined in chapter IV. 
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Naval Deep Strike Capability. In this era of littoral warfare, how much deep 
strike capability does the United States Navy need? This is an area in which we 
have not yet reached a consensus. Many people believe that the maximum limit 
is 500 nautical miles; others hold that 1 80 is sufficient. The strike radius from 
carrier-based aircraft should extend to the farthest landward boundary of the 
LBCA. If the LBCA is to be extended beyond an agreed-upon range limit for 
carrier-based aircraft, landward bases must then be procured inside the LBCA 
to do so. TLAMs or Air Force aircraft should be used for special strikes beyond 
naval aircraft range. The concept here is that the range should fit the battle space 
of the force. This requires study by a joint air-ground group in order to determine 
how deep "deep enough" really is. 
The other key question for fixed-wing aviation is "How much technology is 
enough?" Do we need stealth now that the Soviets are no longer around to 
upgrade air defense technology significantly? Perhaps we would be better off 
to skip production generations of technology if there is no threat on the horizon 
to challenge significantly what we have now. The current proposal to use F- 1 4  
airframes to replace the aging A-6 appears to be a reasonable fi x  until w e  see 
a threat on the horizon that will warrant development of a follow-on. This issue 
is dependent on our being able to give the F- 1 4  an all-weather attack capability. 
Perhaps now is the time to propose interest-bearing "seed bank" accounts to 
Congress, al lowing the services to store money saved by skipping generations 
of new aircraft and then permitting them to buy a truly revolutionary system in 
sufficient numbers when it is really needed. 
Joint Forces Air Component Command (JFACC). The IFACC was one of the 
most difficult issues to emerge from Operation Desert Storm after-action 
review. The Defense Department after-action report on the war in the Gulf 
called for more interoperability between the Navy and other U.S.  armed service 
components and for attempts to centralize coordination of aviation efforts 
between them.34 The degree to which centralization is needed varies from 
contingency to contingency; Operation Sea Angel, the humanitarian assistance 
operation in Bangladesh, did not need nearly the degree of centralization 
required of Operation Desert Storm. However, when complicated centralization 
is needed, the requirement is immensely difficult; Lieutenant General H.C. 
Stackpole ITI pointed out recently that the Navy does not have the capability to 
run a Desert Storm-type IFACC at sea without taking a major Navy platform 
(i.e., CV or LCe) out of combatant status.3S This is a grave deficiency for our 
naval forces if we are to use them as command posts for joint operations. 
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Emerging Nal1al Littoral Warfare Doctrine. How would a naval littoral 
campaign work as an enabling bridge for a joint operation? What follows is a 
view of how naval doctrine for such operations should emerge. 
Phase I. Achieving Superiority in the Littoral Battle Space Control 
Area. The LBCA can be defined as the land, sea, air, and space area requiring 
our control in order to ensure that an enemy cannot foil any proposed naval 
operation of ours. The square (or cubic) mileage will vary depending chiefly 
on the size, technological sophistication, and military capability of our op­
ponent. 
If we contemplate only an MPF offload to reinforce a threatened ally, the job 
will be easy initially; it would probably entail bringing in sufficient naval forces 
to protect the offload. Ifthe enemy chooses not to interfere, the operation might 
well end at Phase I. If Operation Desert Shield had caused Saddam Hussein to 
abandon Kuwait in the fall of 1990, the situation would have been roughly 
analogous to the successful Phase I stand-alone effort. However, the joint 
enabling role played by naval forces in the events leading up to the great 
offensive of Desert Storm is probably a more predictive model for a Phase I 
operation in a major regional contingency. Naval forces provided the early air 
power, credible land power, and joint sustainment for the early phases of the 
crisis. During the buildup phase, sealift provided the vast majority of sustain­
ment. 
If entry into the theater needs to be forcible, Phase I becomes the precursor 
to a standard amphibious operation. Control of the LBCA may well require a 
substantial air-sea-space battle. The use of the word space here is not used in 
an attempt to appear overly visionary. We need control of space to ensure that 
such seemingly simple factors as unhindered use of our satcom links remain 
presumptive; we would not assume that a future opponent will be as accom­
modating as Saddam Hussein in that regard. (National assets can provide space 
control, but such control must be a valid assumption in establishing LBCA 
control.) If an amphibious operation is needed, the LBCA will need to include 
a number of enemy port and airfield complexes within its boundaries as 
potential objectives to keep the opposition uncertain of the actual objective. If 
we are to utilize truly the spirit of maneuver warfare, we will also keep the 
actual objective flexible as well. Figure 10 outlines the concept. 
The most fundamental change in naval warfare occurs in phase I. Control of 
the LBCA will not be a lesser included naval requirement in the future; it will 
be the primary rationale for naval force structure. Sailors and Marines who 
cannot accept that development will not be competitive in a rapidly changing 
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1 00 
I 
1 50  
I 
Sufficient sea space to protect carriers and 
amphi bious ships 1rom shore·based weapons 







The LBCA consists of the sea, air, land,  and space area req uired to ensure that naval operations 
can be conducted without enemy interference. If  an amphibious operation is involved, the LBCA should 
include at least two, and preferably more, port/airfield complexes in order to confuse the enemy as to 
the ulti mate objective. 
J.R. Nunes. Jr. 
Source: Redrawn from Marini! Corps Gauni!, vol . 76, no. 6, June 1 992, p.40. 
Figure 10 
Phase II. Probing for the Seams. If presumptive blue-water sea control is 
the major strategic change of the new world order, the LCAC-LAV-helicopter 
(LLH) team may well be the great operational breakthrough. As used here, the 
tenn "helicopter" includes the medium lift requirement (such as the V -22) as 
well as existing helicopters. In the past, not only were our choices of places to 
land restricted, but once our forces had been deposited ashore, they were 
committed to their beachhead both physically and psychologically. We could 
try to land where the enemy was not, but we were committed even if we guessed 
wrong. The LLH team has changed all of that. Now, we can launch multiple 
probes toward a series of widely separated objectives. We can then choose from 
among them the landing sites we want. If a landing site proves to be unproductive, 
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The probing stage is characterized by the use of a number of probes by LCACs carrying LAVs and 
supported by helicopters to ensure that beaches and landing zones are reasonably clear of opposition. 
If that is not the case, these reconnaissance assets can be quickly withdrawn. In this way, the best focus 
of effort can be determined. 
Source: Redrawn from Marine Corps Gazene, vol. 76, no. 6, June 1992, p. 40. 
Figure 11 
J.R Nunes, Jr. 
we can disengage much more readily than we were able to do in the past. Figure 
1 1  illustrates this concept. 
Moderately productive sites can be used for deception, for supporting 
attacks, and as candidates to shift the focus of effort to as the situation dictates. 
This allows us to keep the enemy off balance, unsure of our actual objective, 
and reacting to our previous move as we begin the next. The LLH team becomes 
the moral equivalent of the swift German reconnaissance forces that made the 
blitzkrieg concept so successful by fmding and exploiting seams in enemy 
defenses in order to allow other forces to flow through in what Liddel Hart 
called a "raging torrent." 
Pbase ill. Seizing tbe Lodgement. Once a fmal airport/seaport lodgement 
has been selected and a focus of effort determined, it can be seized from a 











Having secured a temporary lodgement, the landing force builds up combat power and strike toward 
the main objective from unanticipated directions. 
J.A N ..... Jr. 
Source: Redrawn from Marine Corps Gal.ene, vol. 76, no. 6, June 1992, p. 41 .  
Figure 1 2  
fast-moving, hard-hitting attack will be facilitated by air-delivered precision­
guided munitions (PGMs), Tomahawk-type missiles (TLAMs), and deep strikes 
by Air Force stealth aircraft against targets which, though outside the LBCA, 
might interfere with our operation by means of long-range capabilities or 
fast-moving reserve forces. Better maps than we now have are necessary to 
accomplish all of this. 
Phase IV. The Joint Raging Torrent. Once we are established ashore, we 
can introduce war-winning joint forces into theater. This means that naval 
forces will allow the introduction of Army and Air Force packages capable of 
providing the hammer to end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States 
and its allies, as was done in Operation Desert Storm where the MPF capability 
was a major joint enabler in the early Desert Shield phase. Early response is a 
naval forte, as is continued seaborne sustainment. 
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We must make this transition more seamlessly connected than it was in 
Desert Storm. This sequencing of joint forces into the theater should be done 
in a manner that does not allow the opponent opportunity to organize his forces 
or plans. He must be kept "sightless" and continually reacting to our previous 
move as we proceed with our next. Figure 1 3  illustrates this concept. We fully 
expect that naval forces will contribute to the war-winning hammer, but we 









Sequencing of Joint Forces into Theater 
Heavy Reinforcement 
Once the fi nal lodgment is secure, the joint torrent operation is launched to move to conflict 
termination with terms favorable to the U nited States and its allies. This sequencing must be 'seam­
less' and relatively rapid ; in other words, more rapid than that of enemy's capability to react. 
J.A. Nunes. Jr 
SOUTce: Redrawn from Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 76, no. 6, June 1992, p. 4 1 .  
FIgu re  13 
Phase V. Turning Out the Lights and Closing the Door. As in the Gulf 
war, we can expect naval forces to be the first to go in and the last to leave. The 
integrity of the LBCA must be maintained until it is no longer required. When 
everyone else has gone home, the Navy-Marine Corps team must continue to 
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provide the forward presence that will reinforce the lessons of the 1990-1991 
Gulf crisis and minimize the chance of a reccurrence.36 
So What Is Really New ?  For the most part, things will not really change that 
much for Marines. The Marine Corps was well on its way toward an over-the­
horizon doctrine in coordination with our amphibious brethren in the Navy long 
before the momentous events of 1989-1991. The real change will be in naval 
force structure and doctrine. By switching our focus from blue water to the 
littorals, Navy officers will need to commit themselves to new challenges such 
as mine countermeasures, shallow-water anti-submarine operations, and the 
integration of joint air operations in the maritime environment. Our next 
Nimitzes and Halseys may well look more like Farraguts and Porters. We may 
truly find the future in the past. 
Recommendations. There will be those in the Navy and Marine Corps who 
view the following recommendations as heretical. Some of the recommenda­
tions result from issues proposed by the Naval Force Capabilities Planning 
Effort that resulted in " . . .  From the Sea"; others are those proposed but 
considered to be too radical for inclusion in that document's recommendations; 
and others are the author's own. 
Doctrine. The naval services should develop a joint Navy/Marine Corps 
doctrine center with rotating command to build littoral doctrine.37 The Marine 
Corps currently has a doctrine center, and the Navy is developing one under the 
cognizance of CinCLantFleet in Norfolk. However, that is merely a beginning. 
Separate, independent, Navy-Marine entities will not do the job. We must "bite 
the bullet" and become naval in the Navy-Marine sense of the word if we are 
ever to become truly joint. Moves in this direction are occurring as this is being 
written. 
Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) Capability. The NEF should become 
the primary naval operational warfighter in major regional contingencies. 
Develop a True Naval Component for the Unified CinCs. Combine the 
existing Navy and Marine component staffs in the Atlantic and Pacific into 
Naval Forces Lant and Pac. Structure the staffs as joint Navy-Marine organiza­
tions and rotate command between Navy and Marine flag officers. 
Mine Countermeasures (MCM). First, the Navy must develop a truly 
mobile and capable MCM capability. That means being able to get the assets to 
where they are needed in a timely manner. This is an area where capabilities 
may be centrally pooled for dispatch to a crisis area as needed. Although the 
LLH team affords a better capability than traditional landing craft for avoiding 
mined areas in amphibious operations, we cannot rationalize away the requirement 
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to clear mines effectively from key areas such as ports and choke points when 
the occasion demands it. We will need to use the ports eventually. It may well 
be necessary to explore better ways of integrating Coast Guard capabilities into 
this effort under overall naval cognizance. 
Shallow-Water Antisubmarine Warfare. Sometimes it will be essential to 
be able to destroy enemy submarines in shallow water. Perhaps it will be 
possible to use emerging technologies to conduct these operations. Like the 
minesweeping capability, these assets need not be forward deployed on a 
constant basis; however, they do need to be rapidly deployable. This area ranks 
with MCM as a high priority challenge. 
Improved Defense against Anti-Ship Missiles. The point defense aspects 
of littoral warfare demand constant improvement in this area. 
Joint Forces Air Component Command (JFACC) at Sea. Naval forces 
must be able to do this without taking a platform out of combatant status. We 
currently do not have CVs or LCes to spare. It may be that this capability can 
be pooled for dispatch to the crisis area as needed. 
Protection of Satcom Capabilities. This may not be entirely a naval 
responsibility, but our naval forces should participate fully in the mechanisms 
being developed to ensure the integrity of our entire command and control 
infrastructure in any theater. 
Improved Sea-Based Logistics Capability. Strong emphasis should be 
placed on sea-based logistics and strong host nation support agreements that 
are well insulated from political-military disruption by potential theater adver­
saries. However, the long-term goal of naval contingencies should be to carry 
and store all logistics afloat, transferring items and materiel to other ships and 
commands ashore as needed. 
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What Has Not Changed. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and much that 
followed, a thennonuclear exchange between the United States and Russia is 
more unlikely than ever. Still, the Russian Federation remains the only nation 
on earth capable of destroying the United States. Consequently, the United 
States retains a "strategic" nuclear deterrent of which the ballistic missile 
submarines of the United States Navy are the most survivable portion. They 
can expect to remain so until developments render them unnecessary. The last 
such development may be a long time in coming. 
What Has Changed. As the threat of a superpower nuclear exchange has sunk, 
the threat of regional nuclear proliferation and use has risen. Because the United 
States does not yet have a finnly stated policy on these issues, it is difficult to 
predict the Navy 's future role in this field. Indeed, the line between "strategic" 
nuclear deterrence and regional conventional deterrence is fuzzy. Some U.S .  
experts argue strongly for an across-the-board policy of no proliferation and 
massive retaliation for any first use anywhere, even if this means unilateral 
action by the United States in situations where vital U.S.  interests are not 
threatened. This is intended to send a strong message against nuclear prolifera­
tion. Not everyone shares this view. 
It is clear that there has been proliferation on the part of lesser powers. Four 
of the fonner Soviet republics have nuclear weapons. Despite promises and 
strong international pressures to move those weapons to Russia, as of this 
writing, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine have not done so. There have 
even been press reports that Kazakhstan has sold a nuclear weapon to Iran. In 
addition, Pakistan appears to have a nuclear capability to rival that of India. 
These alanning developments make urgent the rapid development of anti­
proliferation regimes, but there is no consensus as to the fonn that those regimes 
should take. 
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Weapons Security and Accountability. This is a major problem in the 
former Soviet republics. Although there is reasonable assurance that "strategic" 
weapons are accounted for, there is no similar assurance of an accurate count 
of "tactical" nuclear weapons. U.S .  naval forces may well be called upon to 
provide expertise in this area, to participate in international teams of inspection, 
or to contribute consultants in support of future arms control agreements. Some 
believe that the likelihood of a nuclear accident in both the former Soviet Union 
and the Third World is increasing. Should one occur, U.S. naval forces, 
particularly the ARG/MEU(SOC)s and the MPF capability in some form may be 
called upon to conduct humanitarian assistance, disaster, relief, or radiologist 
decontamination operations. This has implications for both logistics and train­
ing. Similar accidents with chemical weapons may also lead to a call for help. 38 
Furthermore, there is a very real possibility of nuclear use or accident in our 
future. 
Proliferation Easier to Deal with Than Post-Proliferation. Proliferation 
is the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state or other actor previously without 
them. Post-proliferation problems that treat the threatened use of nuclear 
weapons or decisions about what to do with them are even more difficult than 
managing the proliferation stage itself. Once a weapon is produced, it is difficult 
to find and deal with, whereas production means and suppliers are easier to cope 
with when proliferation is occurring; this does not mean that this is an easy 
process, as demonstrated by U.S .  and UN experience in Iraq and Korea. The 
Israeli air strike on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 198 1 exemplifies a successful 
action during the proliferation stage. The discussion concerning the difficulty 
of confirming the existence of a Kazakhstan-supplied Iranian bomb, as well as 
the debate about what to do about it, outlines the problems of post-proliferation. 
One thing seems certain, naval forces are likely to be the military response of 
first consideration in a proliferation or post-proliferation crisis. An MEU(SOC) 
raid, TLAM strike, or naval air strike are the most likely on-scene options for 
immediate use. Other naval options range from support of human intelligence 
and reconnaissance to the use of aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious 
forces as a show of force or strike force, if required.39 
The Problems of Preemption. It is difficult to determine how best to 
preempt the firing of a nuclear weapon by a Third World power, even if a 
ready-to-shoot weapon were found. Moreover, not many people, either before 
or after the event, are likely to be enthusiastic about conducting a preemptive 
nuclear attack to dissuade the firing of such a weapon by a Third World actor. 
The naval instruments of preemption would be the same as those we use today 
for dealing with crises and providing forward presence and strategic deterrence. 
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Naturally, one turns to the thought of mounting an overwhelming conven­
tional assault on such an actor, but one must question whether such an assault 
would prevent or would encourage the weapon's possessor to fIre it. It is clear 
that our human intelligence in such situations must get much better. So must 
our knowledge of how naval forces can support human intelligence activities. 
Retaliation. The threat of retaliation to punish the perpetrator of a nuclear 
attack and to deter further conduct of this nature is also a matter for concern. 
But again, it is unclear whether retaliation should be nuclear, conventional, or 
should be contemplated at all. Normal naval forces would have a key role in 
supporting either conventional or nuclear retaliation. The primary challenge in 
an era of reduced U.S.  force structure would be to ensure that the forces retain 
the capability to conduct such operations. 
The United Nations and other Collective Regimes. After a long period of 
indifference, this subject has regained life. The need for some degree of 
long-range seaborne logistical support, particularly from Military Sealift Com­
mand (MSC) vessels, seems to characterize most of the new thought on this 
subject. None, however, require forces or techniques not already in the inven­
tory. 
Observations. The evolving nature of nuclear deterrence may make the very 
idea of "strategic deterrence" obsolete, replacing it with a concept that runs the 
gamut from deterring Russian nuclear use to supporting international anns 
control regimes. To do any such thing at all, will, of course, require policy 
decisions; however, naval leaders will be required to monitor developments 
closely, because the forces they command will be required to play a significant 
role in virtually every policy enforcement action that can reasonably be con­
templated. 
Recommendations. The area of standard nuclear strategic deterrence is one 
where the new world order may actually be less complicated than the old. Naval 
forces will simply be doing the same thing in the future that they have in the 
past, but they will be doing less of it. However, an entirely new set of policy 
and strategy imperatives may arise in response to Third World nuclear prolifera­
tion. Most of these will not require radically new naval capabilities. However, 
the following recommendations are in order. 
Support for Human Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance. In this 
area, forward deployed naval forces must strive constantly for improvement. 
Target information will be the absolute first priority in both proliferation and 
post-proliferation operations. We must improve naval capabilities in both joint 
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operations and operations in conjunction with national intelligence assets. This 
includes naval support of special operations forces. 
Radiological and Nuclear Weapons Expertise. We must work on our 
ability to do radiological decontamination on short notice to ensure that it does 
not atrophy. This includes our ability to do so in both combat and humanitarian 
situations. As part of our preemption capability, as well as to contribute to 
nuclear safety operations, we must be able to rapidly deploy teams capable of 
disarming or disabling nuclear devices. These teams need not necessarily be 
made up of naval personnel, but they will have to fit in with MEU(SOC) or SEAL 
methods of entry and withdrawal. In this regard, we should explore the pos­
sibilities of virtual reality technology as a way of providing technical expertise 
to remote locations without the physical presence of the technician.4O 
Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS). The shipboard com­
patibility of anti-ballistic missile systems should also continue to be a priority 
subject of study. We cannot count on land-based Patriot systems in all situa­
tions. 
Humanitarian Capabilities in Nuclear Disasters. The ability of U.S. naval 
forces to react to a nuclear disaster in a timely and effective manner should be 
reviewed. This is particularly true in the case of reconfiguring the modules 
being developed for MPF ships for low-intensity conflict or humanitarian 
assistance operations. Although not truly a deterrent, this capability may well 
be the military option most likely to be used, given the notoriously low safety 




This Is Not the End of History. The events of 1989- 199 1, which signalled the 
end of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and a superpower naval threat to the 
United States and it allies, should not be viewed as an end to history. At some 
point-perhaps in the distant future, perhaps not-the United States may again 
face another superpower competitor with aspirations and agendas which the 
United States will view as hostile to its own.41 We cannot tell whether such a 
threat will resemble that of the former Soviet Union or stem from a combination 
of power and an ideology or economic philosophy so alien to our own that we 
will consider our vital interests to be threatened. 
When the original draft of the current National Military Strategy appeared 
in the summer of 199 1, the section on reconstitution postulated a renewed 
hostility on the part of an intact Soviet Union.42 Estimates at the time on the 
Soviet ability to reconstitute into a credible threat ranged from eighteen to 
thirty-six months. That draft was prepared before the breakup of the Union into 
fifteen fractious and independent republics. That breakup slowed the former 
Soviet Union's ability to reconstitute so much that a decade might be needed 
to reach the old threat level. It was agreed that this time frame would hold true 
generally for other "potential" superpowers developing a military capability to 
challenge the United States on a global basis. This means that for a decade 
indications and warning of trouble on the horizon likely will be highly visible. 
In any case, the Soviet Union no longer exists. As a result, some observers 
ask whether reconsitution should remain a critical leg of the National Military 
Strategy. It remains the strategy's most difficult and potentially the most 
contentious aspect. Because so little written work has been done on this 
forgotten leg of the National Military Strategy, many of the proposals are the 
author's own, derived from his participation in war games, seminars, and 
discussions on the subject with DoD and service officials. 
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Part of the problem lies in grasping the meaning of the concept. The National 
Military Strategy dermes reconstitution as follows: "As we reduce the size of 
our military forces in response to the demise of the global threat, we must 
preserve a credible capability to forestall any potential adversary from compet­
ing militarily with the United States. This 'reconstitution' is intended to deter 
such a power from militarizing and, if deterrence fails, to provide a global 
warfighting capability. Reconstitution involves fielding, forming, and training 
new fighting units [emphasis added] . This includes initially drawing on cadre­
type units and laid up military assets, particularly shipping; mobilizing pre­
viously trained or new manpower; and activating the industrial base on a large 
scale so as to equip these new forces. Reconstitution also involves maintaining 
technology, doctrine, training, experienced military personnel, and the innova­
tion necessary to retain the competitive edge in decisive areas of potential 
military competition. "43 
The definition listed above has several potential, if inadvertent, red herrings. 
First, in the context of reconstitution, "mobilization" is not generally meant to 
be a call-up of forces but a call-up of assets that have been released to 
non-military purposes in the wake of the Cold War. Second, reconstitution is 
not meant as a threat to economic development on the part of present (potential 
superpower) friends and allies; it is contemplated as a deterrent to the develop­
ment of a superpower military capability by a potential foe.44 
The Nal1al Dimension. The deterrent factor inherent in reconstitution is par­
ticularly relevant here. One of the key causes of the economic collapse of the 
Soviet Union was its attempt to keep up with the United States as an economic 
and a military superpower. The enormous capital investment in Admiral Sergei 
Gorshkov's "blue water" navy may well have been the proverbial straw that 
broke the camel's back for the Soviets. That cost will be an enormous considera­
tion for a potential foe considering its transformation into a military super­
power; therein lies the deterrent value for the United States of possessing a 
reconstitution capability. However, that reconstitution capability must be 
credible; to be credible, it must be affordable. A potential foe must know that 
we can beat a potential superpower threat without doing to ourselves what the 
Soviets did to themselves. 
The cost of reconstitution is a major problem, especially for the Navy, which 
needs expensive ships, aircraft, sensors, and weapons. Not only must we 
accustom ourselves to making do longer with old models, but also we must 
make do with fewer than before. Because of our declining domestic industrial 
base, we must avoid scrapping old ships and replacing them with new ones. To 
fail in this regard could price us out of reconstitution altogether. In itself, 
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reconstitution is a fragile concept because it entails the kind of long-range 
strategic thinking that is not often practiced in the United States. Congress and 
the public are probably willing to spend pennies for an ounce of prevention, but 
they are unlikely to invest in thinly disguised subsidies for the ailing U.S.  
shipbuilding industry. 
What is needed then is a reconstitution philosophy that reflects the fact that 
this leg of the National Military Strategy is a hedge against a future anns race. 
As the largesse of the Reagan defense buildup fades ever further into the past, 
the manner in which we reduce our power will entail making very soon some 
profound decisions about reconstitution which, if they prove mistaken, will not 
be reversible. 
Assumptions. There are several key assumptions implicit in this discussion. 
First, any threat or combination of threats that arise will do so with ap­
proximately a decade' s worth of indications and warning. 
Second, over the next few decades the basic ship propulsion units and hull 
types presently in use will remain operable and no radical technology will 
render them obsolete.45 We must assume further that any radical development 
in these technologies by a potentially hostile power would initiate a correspond­
ing development by the United States, and that accordingly, in the absence of 
such a threat, the United States would not invest in such development. 
Third, most new weapons technologies can be modularized in such a way as 
to be attached to existing hulls rather than requiring "keel-up" development. 
This is not always a popular assumption, but it is technically feasible.46 
Fourth and finally, nuclear submarines can indeed be mothballed for later 
use should the need arise.47 The notion that we cannot do so is being discredited 
rapidly. A senior naval officer admonished his peers to this effect at a recent 
war game. 
Crafting a Naval Reconstitution Strategy. A naval reconstitution strategy 
should have four legs: science and technology, production planning, personnel 
planning, and strategic and doctrinal thought. Each leg should be designed 
carefully and incorporated into the build-down before we make decisions from 
which we cannot recover. 
Science and Technology. We must be careful not to squander our tech­
nological superiority. It is perishable. There are ways both to protect our 
advanced technology and to share much of it with our allies. If, however, we 
should be tempted to spread the fmancial burden of advancing new technologies 
by giving some of our ideas to our allies for development, we could mourn that 
decision for a long time. Despite current goodwill, today 's allies may well be 
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tomorrow's adversaries or neutrals. We would regret it deeply if by our own 
hand we had frozen ourselves out of our own technologies. 
This is not to advocate producing advanced systems simply because we have 
the means to do so. We do need to demonstrate, however, that we can build 
advanced systems in such numbers that a potential foe would know he could 
not win a new arms race. 
Production. The key to the effective use of the production leg of reconstitu­
tion to deter a potential competitor from building a threatening military 
capability is to show that we can make an arms race prohibitively expensive. 
To take a naval example, we must carefully preserve and maintain the ships we 
are now taking out of active service. If these ships remain competitive in coming 
decades, we will have a commanding lead before we cross the starting line. 
A potential competitor will then have to build sufficient ships and weapon 
systems to challenge us on a global scale. If we build our naval reconstitution 
capability on the premise that 20 10 or 2030 we will be able to pull good ships 
out of mothballs and place "state-of-the-art" weapons modules on them, we 
will have tripled the difficulty for the would-be challenger. To compete with 
us, the challenger must first build a naval capability comparable to our un­
reconstituted peacetime naval establishment. This would be a daunting and 
expensive proposition. It could not be kept secret. 
His second challenge would be to overcome our lead in ship construction. 
With our ability to bring out old ships with new weapons modules at ap­
proximately half the cost of building a completely new ship (this obviously 
depends on the absolute cost of technology in the "out years"), the competitor 
would have to pay a "buy-in" cost of at least three times our own simply to join 
the superpower naval club. In contrast, if we adopt an all-new reconstitution 
capability, our opponent will need to invest only enough to match our peacetime 
naval capability before he can run with us ship-for-ship in a naval arms race. 
This is particularly true for submarines. Truly, in reconstitution, better is the 
enemy of good enough. The curve in figure 14 demonstrates that if reconsitution 
is properly conceived, the United States can confront, at an affordable cost to 
itself, a potential opponent with a crushing economic challenge. 
If a technological development comparable to the Civil War ironclad tech­
nology-leap arises, rendering current ships obsolete, the arguments above 
would become moot, and we would be compelled to invest in new technology. 
But that does not render the policy of creative mothballing ineffective as a 
prudent hedge against a future naval arms race. 
The money saved in buying ships can be used for capitalizing on new weapon 
systems, EW suites, and information warfare capabilities. Even in the "worst 
case" situation where we would need to build entirely new hulls and propulsion 
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systems to counter a radically new emerging technology, the skills needed may 
be so new that old shipyards would be rendered cost-ineffective anyway.48 
Some new construction will be needed to maintain required defense skills, but 
this author believes we would be prudent to limit this to what is essential. 
The only area where the argument cited above may not apply entirely is in 
the construction of nuclear submarines; this industry has some very perishable 
skills. If some form of subsidy is needed to keep those skills current and present 
in the shipyard, we should find a way that is more economical than building 
unneeded and unwanted attack submarines. Perhaps a solution would be to keep 
one of the submarine yards "warm" by mothballing submarines as they are 
decommissioned. 
We must also keep open production lines for scarce, slowly produced 
munitions to replace those munitions expended in regional contingencies and 
also for expansion in case of reconstitution. The answer here may well be to 
encourage "skunk works" contractors who will respond to small orders while 
keeping key-skills personnel employed as an educational base for expansion. 
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People Programs. How do we best sustain the skills needed to conduct 
blue-water sea control without bankrupting the personnel accounts of the naval 
services? The reserves are an obvious answer. Today we have two essential 
types of reservists in the Navy: those who support the active duty establishment 
such as the TAR program, and those who support expansion in mobilization­
mine warfare is a current capability here. A recent seminar on reserve 
capabilities suggested a third category that would embody a reconstitution pool. 
A first step in such a progam would be to shift the Navy's mine warfare 
capability from the reserves into regular service and replace it with much of 
what is now in the active anti-submarine community. If properly managed, the 
reserve surge mobilization capability can be used as a reconstitution cadre. 
It is important to remember here the dissimilarity between reconstitution and 
mobilization. We mobilize what is currently in the reserves. We reconstitute to 
give us a greater mobilization capability. If a P-3 squadron is in reserve status, 
it can be mobilized to help in a regional contingency where there is a moderate 
submarine threat. With a reasonable investment, that squadron can also be 
prepared to act as cadre for reconstitution expansion. By educating the squadron 
members to accept positions of responsibility two levels above those that they 
are holding, we pave the way for the expanded schools and training squadrons 
that would put real teeth into the naval reconstitution capability . This 
philosophy was adopted by General Hans von Seeckt when he prepared the 
Gennan l00,OOO-man anny to expand in the years between the world wars, 
although our problem is not as severe as that which the Gennans faced. The 
successes of the Gennan Anny between 1939 and 1942 attest to the efficacy of 
a "two-up" educational philosophy.49 
The same could be provided to reserves maintaining laid-up ships. Training 
units could concentrate on maintaining the cadre for schools, stressing blue­
water sea control skills not needed on a day-to-day active service basis but vital 
for reconstitution to deal with an emerging blue-water threat. This would 
require frequent exercises with the active forces to keep these skills reasonably 
fresh. 
The Marine Corps presently maintains a balanced reserve component for 
mobilization and would not need to reorganize as thoroughly as the Navy to 
transition from a blue-water to a littoral strategy.  However, the Marine Corps 
Reserve would be an excellent place to create the cadres for expansion during 
a time of reconstitution. 
The education of mid-level officers in operational and strategic thought 
would be an absolute imperative for regulars and reserves alike. Consideration 
should be given to a second year "art of naval warfare" course at the Naval War 
College, similar to the courses at Leavenworth, Maxwell, and Quantico. 
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Doctrine. Blue-water sea control doctrine should not be abandoned but put 
on the shelf and refined as new technologies become available. It should also 
be exercised and war-gamed, although not nearly as frequently as littoral 
operations. The reconstitution cadres should be carefully integrated into such 
exercises, and the essentials of blue-water sea control should be taught in 
service schools. The naval doctrine center should refine this subject and keep 
it current with state-of-the-art technology. However, it should be recognized as 
a future case rather than a prerequisite to littoral warfare. Some degree of risk 
must be accepted in a time of scarce resources. We will have to accept the fact 
that we will not have a top-of-the-line blue-water navy in the absence of a high 
seas threat. Our alternative is to become irrelevant to real defense needs. 
React Incrementally to I&W if Necessary. The need to reconstitute totally 
might not become immediately apparent, and the naval services might need to 
react incrementally as bits and pieces of the puzzle become clear. This will be 
particularly true if we become aware that another power is pursuing 
breakthrough developments in the key elements of naval technologies listed 
earlier in this chapter. The naval services may find themselves in the position 
of playing "Paul Revere," calling for the implementation of reconstitution. 
A Final Observation. In reconstitution, we find one of the purest examples of 
the naval forces' capability to act as a political-economic instrument of U.S. 
policy. Our obvious readiness to reconstitute could well become our best 






he United States has entered an era in which this nation is the world's 
only true superpower, in every sense of the word. Although the threat of 
global war and that of a nuclear holocaust has lessened, we are still far short of 
world peace. There are few nations that have enjoyed our situation, and certainly 
there are no exact parallels. The new National Security and Military strategies 
are an attempt to deal with the emerging world order in a manner that will 
prevent wars, if possible, or win decisively should prevention fail.  The new 
strategies stress working with and through multinational instruments such as 
the United Nations to achieve security and order. The naval policy, strategy, 
and doctrinal developments advocated in this study define the naval contribu­
tion to the national strategy. They would provide a Navy and Marine Corps 
better unified in purpose and function than before. They also would be in 
synchronization with the joint approach to military operations that has been 
evolving in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. 
The proposed strategy presented herein is an alternative to that proposed by 
Admiral Paul David Miller, who at the time of this writing is CinCLant. Admiral 
Miller's concept of adaptive joint force packaging foresees using a naval force 
structure that has grown smaller than that which existed in 1989, but one that 
has grown smaller in the same Cold War proportions of carriers, submarines, 
ASW assets, escorts, MeM, and amphibious shipping. Admiral Miller's 
proposal gives the CinCs less than optimal packages. 
The naval force structure advocated in this paper would also have fewer 
ships, but it would give the CinCs adequate carriers, ARG/MEU packages, and 
MPS to accomplish the forward presence missions they deem vital. 
The force structure advocated here foresees a navy of about 350-375 ships, 
achieved by making do with fewer escorts, submarines, and ASW assets. It is a 
navy driven by warflghters' dreams and not by the aspirations of parochial 
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The development of naval strategy beyond Mahan will be a dynamic process. 
Having achieved naval supremacy, our goal now must be to use that power in 
search of a true Pax Universalis. 
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Amphibious Ready Group 
Amphibious Ready Group/ 
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Commander Amphibious Task Force/ 
Commander Landing Force 
Central Command 
Commander in Chief 
Commander in Chief Central Command 
Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet 
Commandant of the Marine Corps 
Chief of Naval Operations 
Commander Marine Component, 
Central Command 
Commander Naval Component, 
Central Command 
Aircraft Carrier 
Aircraft Carrier Battle Group 
Carrier Air Wing 
Electronic Warfare 
Forward Edge of the Battle Area 
Fly-in-Echelon 
Forward Operating Base 
Fighter Wing Equivalent 
Global Protection Against Limited Strikes 
Host Nation Support 
Indications and Warning 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Joint Forces Air Component Command 
Joint Forces Command-East 
Joint Forces Command-North 
Light Armored Vehicles 
Landing Craft Air Cushion 
Amphibious Command Ship 



































Marine Air Ground Task Force 
Marines Central Command 
Mine Countermeasures 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
Mediterranean 
Marine Expeditionary Force 
Marine Expeditionary Unit, 
Special Operations Capable 
Military Operations in Urban Terrain 
Maritime Prepositioning Forces 
Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 
Major Regional Contingency 
North Atlantic Treaty Organiztion 
Naval Component Commander 
Naval Expeditionary Force 
Naval Expeditionary Task Force 
Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation 





Sea, Air, Land (Team) 
Special Operations Capable 
Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine 
Aviation Logistics Ships 
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile 
Training and Administration of Reserves 
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and personnel 
U.S. Central Command 
U.S. Commander in Chief Central Command 
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